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A Policy Research Challenge towards 
Governance of Global Critical 
Infrastructure Systems under Extra-
Extra-Ordinary Disaster Risks: Vitae 
Systems of Systems of Survivability
1. Introduction
Critical Infrastructures, as officially men-
tioned perhaps for the first time and defined in 
the US Patriot Act of 20011), are “those systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 
[…] that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combi-
nation of those matters.”
However a question arises: what makes 
difference between “critical” infrastructure 
and simply, (non-critical) infrastructure per 
se?  The author makes a point that the term 
critical infrastructure as originally used and 
commonly accepted remains yet very confusing 
and scientifically not rigorous. It is claimed in 
this paper that critical infrastructure should 
not be regarded as something that is developed 
“to exist as an object;” Instead, it should be con-
sidered as a “subject” or a “problem/policy issue” 
which calls for special consideration of “critical 
characteristics” attached to the infrastructure is 
polysemous, implying multiple meanings, and 
thus requires rigorous semantic examination.
Abstract:
This paper addresses the need for the problem of governing globally networked 
infrastructure systems of systems under extra-extra ordinary disaster risk such as the 
Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster (March 11th, 2011). First the definition of critical 
infrastructure is reexamined. For the purpose of rigorous examination of how the critical 
and vital states of networked infrastructures need to be governed, the notion of survivability 
based on Vitae System is discussed to extend the notion of resilience. For illustration, a case of 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a global critical marine traffic corridor is presented.
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2. What is Critical Infrastructure?
2.1    Definitions reexamined
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
the word “critical” is used to mean   either of five 
different senses, among which the following two 
are considered most relevant to characterizing 
“critical infrastructure:”
Definition #1 (of a situation or problem) having 
the potential to become disastrous; at a point of 
crisis.
Definition #2  Relating to a point of transiting 
from one state to another (Math. & Physics)
From Definition #1 it is reasonable to list 
up the following qualifications of the infrastruc-
ture being “critical:”
i. dependent on a situation or problem
ii. disaster  (disastrous) or crisis
iii. its potential
In this connection it may be reasonable for 
us to take note of “disasters” or “crises” that are 
triggered by natural or social hazards (threats.) 
In fact non-ordinary types of disasters in both 
frequency (extremely low) and consequence 
(extraordinary large) have been increasing 
in Japan, Asia and other regions of the globe. 
For example, in Japan, the March 11th 2011’s 
Eastern Japan Great Earthquake, an increas-
ing number of huge typhoon disasters and 
extraordinary heavy rainfall disasters hitting 
different areas of Japan almost every year, just 
to name a few.   Increasing ‘potentials’ of such 
extra-extra ordinary disasters explain well why 
and how infrastructure (particularly lifelines) 
should be studied, designed and managed more 
as a policy issue from the viewpoint of criticality 
of infrastructure.
From Definition #2 which is used commonly 
in science and mathematics, the following key 
items can be listed to relate to the criticality of 
infrastructure.
iv. transition
v. from one state to another
We also note that the Definition #1 of “criti-
cal” has two sub-meanings:
(1) extremely ill and at risk of death
(2)  having a decisive or crucial importance 
in the success or failure of something
Accordingly the following list of key items 
is given to characterize the criticality of infra-
structure.
vi. risk of death or crisis of survivability
vii. decisive or crucial importance
viii.  success or failure of infrastructure 
management and operation
It is also worth looking into the original 
meaning of “critic.” krinein (Greek) which means
ix. judge or decide
This is considered quite essential to what 
is meant by “critical.”  It implies that one has to 
judge or decide if it (the infrastructure) is criti-
cal or not. In other words “critical infrastructure 
problems” inevitably involve crucial decision-
making to judge if it is critical or not, and if yes, 
how such decision can be made effectively and 
timely by whom and how.
2.2    Definition of “vital”
As underlined by the author in the defini-
tion of critical infrastructure by US Patriot Act 
of 2001, we should also pay attention to another 
word, i.e., “vital,” which seems to be used in a 
tautological definition of “critical.”
According to Oxford English Dictionary, the 
word “vital” has the following meanings.
a.  absolutely necessary; essential: indis-
pensable to the continuance of life
b. full of energy; lively
c.  fatal (causing death leading to failure or 
disaster)
It is remarked that the core meaning of 
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“vital” is “continuance of life” and “liveliness” 
that might turn to certain death leading to 
disaster. This implies that in a critical event 
it could put people or organization at death 
risk.  Notably Okada2) has made this point and 
proposed to explicitly model the process of this 
“narrowly continuing life at risk.” He named this 
process “surviving process” and claimed that it 
consists of three aspects of “survivability,” that 
is, survivability from certain death, vitality-
based survivability, and communication-based 
survivability. He then proposed to call them, for 
short, “survivability,” “vitality” and “ communi-
cation” (or “con-vivality”), respectively. Okada’s 
Vitae System Model formulates the prototype 
model of surviving behaviors of any living body 
by making use of these three indispensable 
functions in a critical event.
Figures 1 to 3 are shown to illustrate the 
essential points of Vitae Systems Applied to the 
Risk Governance of Critical Infrastructure. For 
details the readers are invited to refer to the 
Figure. 1   Processes of Survivability followed by Resiliency
Figure. 2   Vitae System Agent As a Node of Social Networks to Overcome Life-critical Events (by Okada)
Figure. 3   Physical Infrastructure Network vs. Vitae System Agent Social Network
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papers [2] and [3].
2.3  key factors which characterize 
“criticality” of infrastructure
To sum up the above definitional discus-
sions, the following key factors are listed to 
characterize “criticality” of infrastructure.
i. dependent on a situation or problem
ii. disaster  (disastrous) or crisis
iii. its potential
iv. transition
v. from one state to another
vi. risk of death or crisis of survivability
vii. decisive or crucial importance
viii.  success or failure of infrastructure 
management and operation
ix. judge or decide
In addition it is advised to add the above-
stated “vital” factors as follows:
a. indispensable to the continuance of life
b. lively
c.  fatal  (causing death leading to failure 
or disaster)
In other words these 12 factors need to 
be taken into account when we discuss what 
makes critical infrastructure special about as 
compared to infrastructure without the adjec-
tive of “critical.”
3.  Policy Study on Maritime Global 
Critical Infrastructure by IRGC 
and DPRI, Kyoto University
3.1     The Definition of Maritime Global 
Critical Infrastructure (MGCI)
By applying the definition of Critical 
Infrastructures by the US Patriot Act of 2001 
[1],  Maritime Global Critical Infrastructures 
(MGCI) are systems and assets as they relate 
to marine activities specifically and can impact 
international security, global economic security, 
public health or safety, or any combination of 
these. This paper proposes to elaborate on the 
above definition: We deal with MGCI as a policy 
issue on the critical/vital risk governance of 
complex systems which consist of infrastruc-
tures (lifelines) of infrastructures (lifelines) net-
worked either interlocally, regionally, globally 
and  cross-sectorally.
The author has served as the principal coor-
dinator of this policy research project. For the 
sake of space only the summary of this study is 
given below.
3.2  The Summary of the Report
 4)
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are 
one of the most important sea lanes in the world 
. They are a strategic passage for global trade, a 
source of oil, mineral and mangrove resources, 
and a centre for the Earth‘s marine and coastal 
biodiversity. Locally, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore derive different economic benefits 
from the Straits, but jointly shoulder the burden 
of environmental, safety and security risks. 
Globally, outsiders which depend on passage, 
especially Japan, China and Korea, would be 
negatively impacted by disasters that could lead 
to disruptions in the Straits. As such, the Straits 
constitute a prime example of a Maritime Global 
Critical Infrastructure that supports economies 
and societies locally and worldwide. Global Crit-
ical Infrastructure (GCI) offers a new perspec-
tive on emerging critical infrastructure systems 
characterised by globally and internationally 
connected critical infrastructure networks of a 
high level of complexity. Responsible risk gover-
nance of GCI requires a broadened perspective to 
creatively manage risks in increasingly complex, 
stressed systems. It can help improve resilience 
and the capacity of stakeholders in the Straits to 
cope with surprises. This may be accomplished 
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by being proactive in the development of preven-
tion, preparedness, response and recovery strate-
gies to deal with known, uncertain and unknown 
hazards (adapted from IRGC, 2005).
The Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) 
in the Straits deploys and continues to develop 
technologies and processes to ensure undisrupted 
navigation, notably through the ship reporting 
system STRAITREP, the Traffic Separation 
Scheme and the Marine Electronic Highway. 
However, due to geographical constraints of the 
deep sea channels, the proximity to critical hin-
terland infrastructure, the high concentration 
of economic activities and the ecological impor-
tance, the Straits are vulnerable to hazards of 
natural, technological, human and malicious 
origin.
The risk governance of Maritime Global Critical 
Infrastructures is of interest to the Disaster Pre-
vention Research Institute (DPRI) at Kyoto Uni-
versity and the International Risk Governance 
Council (IRGC). In this context, two expert work-
shops and initial scenario-based discussions 
were held in 2009 and late 2010 to specifically 
address the case of the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore. These workshops and discussions 
showed that beyond traditional maritime casu-
alties, there are trans-boundary threats and 
risk cascades that affect both land and sea with 
regional and global consequences. The Straits 
can be analysed as a “system of systems” with 
multiple and overlapping circles of stakeholders 
from local to regional to global scales, including 
public, private and non-governmental organ-
isations as well as civil society. The scenarios 
discussed were: an explosion in an industrial 
area of refineries and petrochemical facilities, a 
cyber-attack on marine electronic systems, and 
ship collisions. These scenarios revealed poten-
tial risk governance deficits, including: insuf-
ficient awareness to new threats, inadequacy of 
early warning systems, unequal organisational 
capacity and burden sharing among littoral and 
user states, and the difficulty of dealing with 
dispersed responsibilities among stakeholders 
with diverging interests. Some of these deficits 
have already been addressed by the landmark 
effort known as the Cooperative Mechanism A 
culture of cooperation among the littoral states 
has been critical in preventing and mitigating 
some hazards in the Straits, notably in the cases 
of piracy and oil spills, but it should be strength-
ened and expanded to deal with other hazards 
and to include other stakeholders. In fact, 
existing mechanisms are not adequate to deal 
with all identified hazards and emerging risks, 
leading the authors of this report to propose five 
major recommendations.
3.3  Policy Recommendations
It is recommended that the littoral states, 
with user states, the maritime community and 
other concerned stakeholders: No.1 Harmonise 
methodologies, tools and procedures for risk 
assessment of maritime infrastructure and oper-
ations that start with the identification of possi-
ble triggering events, notably in terms of attacks 
on cyber-security, based on generally accepted 
frameworks. No.2 Implement an integrated 
disaster risk management approach by extend-
ing the scope of the existing emergency response 
system from a specifically oil spill contingency 
plan to provide an all-hazards plan. This would 
include the specification and sharing of multi-
hazards and risk maps, communication chains, 
and an appropriate tri-lateral (Indonesia-Malay-
sia-Singapore) emergency operations system, and 
regular training exercises.#3 Prepare joint  con-
tingency plans in case of a closure of the Straits, 
involving navies, coast guards, port authorities, 
shipping companies, communities, among 
other key players. The plans should include 
notification, alternative routes, and a tri-lateral 
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(Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore) effort to reopen 
the Straits. No. 4 Conduct comprehensive, joint 
(Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore and user coun-
tries) risk assessments of the environmental, soci-
etal and economic impact of major activities in 
the Straits. The aim of these assessments would 
be to verify the appropriateness, consistency and 
sufficiency of existing policies and their imple-
mentation. More broadly, they would contribute 
to develop long-term cooperation between the 
littoral states and other stakeholders.#5 Create 
an observatory or ad hoc expert joint committees, 
embedded within the TTEG and Cooperative 
Mechanism, which would act as a representative 
and neutral platform for collecting and evaluat-
ing data to advise key stakeholders.
For illustrations Figures 4 to 6 are shown.
Figure. 5   A Local Network as a Unit of MGCI4)
Figure. 4   MGCI as Network of Networks4)
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4. Conclusion
Instead of discussing how to “build” critical 
infrastructures per se, we should switch our way 
of thinking. Let us take it more as a matter of 
why and how we see the problem “so critical.” If 
we have a global perspectives and concerns, the 
problem can be framed and treated as a global 
issue. Therefore it would be more advisable 
to study how we formulate the critical infra-
structure problem as a perceived policy issue. 
This requires us to question: how we scope the 
problem, who are stakeholders, and how we 
set up a forum where such policy issues can be 
effectively communicated together so as to come 
up with workable scenarios and implementable 
countermeasures for the stakeholders involved.
The presented case study may help us 
understand and systematically imagine what 
types of critical infrastructure problems need to 
be better focussed, discussed and systematically
examined.
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